








 Jéan-Paul Sartre crafted himself a controversial profile that radically deviated from his natural 
identity. How do we reconcile the paradox of his national-intellectual heritage of a bourgeois 
white male native of the République française with his role as the collaborator with the 
founders of the Negritude Movement and the later Africanist anticolonial struggle? This paper 
accounts for this apparently paradoxical life-acts by explicating that they germinated from his 
novel philosophical postulation on the nature of consciousness and self-knowledge, his  
doctrine of the constantly self-creating ‘egoless consciousness’ that he developed during his 
monumental critique of Edmund Husserl in The Transcendence of the Ego (1937). It is here 
argued that his insistence on the Ego as being reflective consciousness in its self-transcendence, 
which became a foundational tenet of his phenomenological existentialism, was demonstrated 
in his own life, framing himself a de-absolutised self-identity. Besides demonstrating this 
genitive link between the development of his philosophy and his consequent life of selfless 
solidarity with the un-free globally, it is highlighted that Sartre’s philopraxis may bear an 
efficacious contribution to contemporary debates on the force of the facticity of racial and 
national identity. 
 






“Each for-itself, in fact, is for-itself only by choosing itself beyond nationality and race”1 
 
1. Introduction 
The paradox between the prodigious political representations that became emblematic of  Jéan-
Paul Sartre (b.1905-1980) and his natural identity constitute a veritable status questionis. These 
principally, include the paradox of his national-intellectual heritage of a bourgeois white citizen 
of the République française and his record of unswerving support of the armed struggle of the 
Algerian national liberation front (Front de Libération Nationale) against his “fatherland” 
during the late nineteen-fifties. This went to the extent of him calling his own people, in a 
converse reversal of a characterisation Hegelian European philosophy had reserved for 
Africans, “zombies”, entities bereft of consciousness and rational capacity, as he did in the 
Preface to Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth (Fanon, 1963, p. 12). What could be a 
plausible theoretic account for this nationalistically uncommitted sense of self-identity?   
 
What rationale could be proffered for his overt support of the Cuban Revolution, 
declaring in 1960 that Ernesto Guevara de la Serna, then a key minister in Fidel Castro’s cabinet 
during the Cuban Missiles Crisis, was the “most perfect human being alive” (Young, 2006, 
xxi)?  Ché Guevara, a native of Argentina, led military campaigns that overthrew the Batista 
regime in Cuba, ending up a Cuban national icon who epitomised Cuban socialist 
internationalism and an itinerant commander of anti-colonial military campaigns in Africa and 
Latin America. During these campaigns Guevara would assume a falsified identity, nom de 
querre, and physical disguises for years (March, 2012, pp. 126-127). Was it Guevara’s 
disregard for his Argentinian national identity and his ability to sustain the ephemeralisation of 
his identity that earned him the admiration and bestowal of the ostentatious title of “the most 
perfect [authentic?] human being” from the classical philosopher of existential authenticity? 
 
Unraveling the foregoing enigmatic questions is the objective of this paper.  I aim to 
account through a systematic philosophical reconstruction that is esoteric to Sartre’s 
existentialist thought system, on how he serially crafted his life as a “project”, or decidedly, an 
undefinable projected-being2. He famously declared that “If man, as the existentialist sees him, 
is not definable, it is because to begin with, he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, 




 Inspired by his meditation on the relationship between existential phenomenology and 
Existential Psychoanalysis in the concluding chapter of Being and Nothingness (Sartre, 
1943/2003, pp. 578-595 [Being and Nothingness, hereafter “BN”]) I critically decipher the 
connection between his conceptualisation of self-identity, and how postulations arising out of 
this played themselves out in his very life. Specifically, the paper posits a theoretical 
explication of how as a consequence of his hypothesis of the ego that is conceived of as 
superfluous and a hindrance to the phenomenology of self-consciousness, and as being forever 
in its self-transcendence, Sarte crafted for himself a historical profile which in its natural 
appearance, as identity, would variously be judged by observers as either heroic (Young, 2006) 
or tragic (Desan, 1960; Gordon, 2015). In this way, this paper takes the debate on the ego, as 
the interiorised reflexive I, beyond its abstract ontological vicissitudes into the ramifications of 
its social-identitarian manifestations, and personal political life commitments. 
The intricacies of how a person becomes conscious of herself, that is, self-reference and 
selfhood is one of the intractable problems of Western Philosophy. As Sartre put it, the 
“structure of the reflection-reflecting has disconcerted philosophers over centuries” (BN, 100). 
Pierre-Jean Renaudie (2013), for example, illustratively dramatises this mystique of 
“consciousness conscious of itself” in the title of his essay “Me, Myself and I: Sartre and 
Husserl on the elusiveness of the Self”3.  This psycho-philosophical question into how 
consciousness constitutes itself as the human self in the lived-world became both a personal 
existential agony a key theoretical challenge for Sartre from the very beginning of his career 
as a philosopher and literary artist. This disconcertedness is evidenced by his interest in 
philosophical psychology at the formative phase of his career, during which period he 
published Imagination: a psychological critique (1936), Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 
(1939) and The Imaginary: the phenomenological psychology of imagination (1940). This 
existential agony is also evidenced by how towards the conclusion of his magnum opus, Being 
and Nothingness he delves into “existential psychoanalysis”. Contrasted to “empirical 
psychoanalysis”, the latter, according to him, is the deciphering, questioning, and interpreting, 
by ourselves, of our experience of our consciousness (BN, 589; see May et al,1958).  
 
Moving beyond this psychological domain, he confronted this enigma (consciousness 
conscious of itself) as an existential-phenomenological inquiry on how self-experience could 
constitute itself as the human self in the live-world. This forced him into a critique of Edmund 
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Husserl’s conception of the structure of subjective consciousness as being a tripartite schema 
of “I” (the Ego), the thinking act (noesis) and the intended meaning (noema), in which he 
argued that the Ego is superfluous to this structure as it is a transcendental dimension of the 
entire process this ontological self-situating self-reflection, and must thus be bracketed off. 
This aspect of Sartre’s thought system which we will explore in this paper, concludes that in 
the lived-world, self-consciousness inexorably becomes an objectified self in the experience of 
the Other, whilst retaining an axiological impulsion to retain its authenticity.  This is the 
phenomenology of self-consciousness conceived in its manifestation with its identitarian 
dimension, that is, as self-constituted self-identity, not merely as the self-referencing Ego in 
the world, but the real person, as known in the world.  
Following his broaching of the foregoing in the concluding paragraphs of The 
Transcendence of the Ego (1937/2004), he could in Being and Nothingness: An essay on 
phenomenological ontology (1943/2003) emphasise that “in fact, in self-consciousness, the 
Self itself apprehends itself . . . this self-consciousness is pure self-identity, pure existence for 
itself” (BN, 259). Furthermore, he valorised Edmund  Husserl’s a priori meanings (facticity) 
(Husserl 1913/2006, para 7-29) by recognising the process of the formation of  social identity, 
stating how “each for-itself, in fact, is for-itself only by choosing itself beyond nationality and 
race” (BN, 541) upon noting, the problematique that  “much more than he appears ‘to make 
himself’, man (sic) seems ‘to be made’ by climate and the earth, race, class, language, the 
history collectivity of which he is part, heredity, the individual circumstances of his childhood, 
acquired habits, the great and small events of his life.” (BN, 503) 
My claim is that, at its core, Sartre’s philosophy is a personalised resolution of this 
problematique of the self that has to situate itself authentically against the countervailing 
ontological effects of facticity (the given, natural condition we find around and about us). This, 
I will show, is poignantly disclosed in two of his works: his psychoanalytical autobiography 
Words (1963/1964) and the philosophical novel, Nausea (1938/1966), written between the 
intervals of his more psychologically-inclined publications we referred to above.  I maintain 
that his theorisation of this agony over the ontological situatedness or authenticity of his 
existence as an objective consciousness that is susceptible to being framed by the world of 
Others, is what motivated his critical reconceptualization of Husserl’s description of the Ego, 
the I, as a feature of the structure of consciousness that not only constitutes first-person 
experience as self-knowledge but third-person self-experience4 as self-identity.  It in this 
critical respect that this paper differs with, and extends Stephen Priest’s The Subject in 
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Question: Sartre's Critique of Husserl in The Transcendence of the Ego (2000). I offer a 
philosophical account of how the intellectual engagement resulting from this 
reconceptualization of self-formation assumed a peregrination that led him to his “doctrine” of 
an egoless consciousness that he systematically elaborated with statements such as “I am the 
self which I will be, in the mode of not being it” (BN, 68), and defended in Existentialism is 
Humanism (1946/2007 [hereafter “EH”) along the line that “man (sic) is nothing other than 
what he makes of himself”(p. 22). 
Sartre believed and practiced that, as best phrased by John Russon, “it is only in its 
embracing of its not-being-able-to-(yet)-be-itself-that the self is properly itself” (Russon 
2008:103).  I, therefore, contend that this experience of the self as the “not-yet”, twinned with 
the contention in Existentialism is Humanism that “man is nothing other than what he makes 
of himself”, whilst conscious of the force of the constrains of facticity, rendered him a being-
in-the-world (nay, a For-itself) in a constant state of anguish, ever alert to the compulsion of 
choice between risk-laden authenticity and the comfort of disappearing into self-deceptive 
conformity (“bad faith”). He was forever “ego-structuring”, caught in self-transcendence. The 
ultimate outcome was to be an enigmatic person, a phenomenon revealing itself to us as 
epitomised by the title of his official biography by John Gerassi, Jean-Paul Sartre: hated 
conscience of his century, protestant or protestor? (1989), and his revelation late in his life 
that, on reflection, he had been an anarchist without realising it (Contat & Sartre, 1975). 
For effect, Sartre penned the following paragraph in a January 6, 1940 letter to Simone 
de Beauvoir: 
Since I have broken my inferiority complex vis-a`-vis the far Left, I feel a 
freedom of thought I’ve never known before; vis-a`-vis the phenomenologists 
too. I feel I’m on the way, as biographers say around page 150 of their books, 
to discovering myself. Which only means that I no longer think with an eye to 
certain strictures (the Left, Husserl), etc., but with total gratuitous freedom, out 
of pure curiosity and disinterestedness, accepting in advance that I could end up 
a Fascist if that’s where my reasoning led me. Don’t worry, I doubt that will 
happen . . . (in Flynn, 2014, 163). 
This letter ominously laid out the vista of a philosophy he would craft and a life he would live 
from thence.  
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I thus, principally suggest that it was consequent to his subjective examination of the 
existentiality of self-consciousness and his enduring fidelity to his philosophical commitments 
(to the phenomenological method)  that Monsiuer Jean-Paul Charles-Ayward Sartre became  
“Sartre”,  our object of wonder and consternation: The white Frenchman who penned Black 
Orpheus, a Preface to Léopold Senghor’s anthology of Negritude poets5, not only introducing 
African French poets to the French public, but defending his categorisation of their work as 
“anti-racism racism”, and calling this 1948 collection, the only revolutionary poetry in the 
French language at the time; “Sartre” the author of Présence noiré (Black Presence) in 1947; 
“Sartre” the writer of a far-reaching endorsement of anti-colonial violence in the Preface to 
Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth; “Sartre”  who agonised that had he not declined the 1964 
Nobel Prize for Literature, at the time Nelson Mandela was sentenced to Robben Island Prison 
for armed sabotage,  he would have donated the entire proceedings to the  “London anti-
apartheid committee”; “Sartre” the conscience of the emergent post-colonial African elite who 
in the essay  “The Political thought of Patrice Lumumba”,  published as part of his collection 
Situations V: Colonialism and Neo-colonialism in 1964 foresaw how the new post-colonial 
African bourgeoisie will frustrate the African renaissance;  “Sartre”, the man who never owned 
any property, and never opened a bank account (Contat & Sartre, 1975); “Sartre” the 
philosopher who exhibited an identity obstinately grounded in the freedom of others, even if it 
threatened his very own life, and reputation. He survived two bomb attacks targeted at his 
nominal residences in Paris6. 
Why did we have to repeatedly write and read “Sartre, the . . . .” and put his name in 
inverted commas? The reason is esoteric to the argument and conclusion I will defend in the  
this paper. In the structure of his first-person consciousness, Sartre did not conceive of himself 
as a self that is fixed in history. According to him, the hypostasis of his self-consciousness 
dictated that “every instant of our conscious lives reveals to us a creation ex nihilo. Not a new 
arrangement but a new existence” (TE, 46).  This statement, as David Cerbone observes, 
“anticipated the later rejection of the principle of identity in defining the for-itself [human 
existence]” (Cerbone, 2006, 87). The rejection of this principle of identity would be poignantly 
demonstrated in the nature of his autobiography,  Words [Les Mots] (1964, hereafter “TW”),  
which has as its sub-text the subversion of the historicisation of human existence (see Flynn, 
2014, 170). The reflective narration of his life, written at the age of fifty-eight, ends abruptly 




The past had not made me. On the contrary, it was I, rising from my ashes, who 
plucked my memory from nothingness by an act of creation that was always 
being repeated. Each time I was reborn better, and I made better use of the inert 
reserves of my soul for the simple reason that death, which was closer each time, 
lit me up more brightly with its dim light. (TW, 236) 
In this demonstration of the theoretic linkage between the formulation of Sartre’s revolutionary 
existentialist phenomenological ontology and his life-actions I proceed as follows: I start with 
a nuanced interpretation of Sartre’s critique of Husserl, in which I highlight the development 
of a Sartrean cogito (“I exist, I think” = I am) in which the transcendence of the “I” into a self-
created me prominently demonstrated.  I then proceed to address the conundrum of how this 
intentionally free “me” during its self-formation has to negotiate the immanent force of 
facticity, which facticity includes the imposition of identitarian ascriptions by Others. Having 
established the nature of the “dialectic” between transcendence and facticity, as demonstrated 
in Sartre’s own praxis, towards my conclusion, I corroborate my central claim through the 
submission of a selection of references and extrapolations from his writings to indicate how his 
“doctrine” of an egoless consciousness shaped his life into an eclectic profile of a stream of  
“Being” and “Nothingness”. 
 
2. Transcendence and Intentionality  
By the time Sartre immersed himself into the inquiry on the structure of self-consciousness,  
psychologist Franz Brentano (b. 1838-1917) had already established that consciousness can 
only be human consciousness through intentionality, and Martin Heidegger (b. 1889-1976) had 
demonstrated that, as human consciousness, it is a modality of being-in-the-world, and thus a 
question of ontology, instead of epistemology. Earlier, Husserl (b. 1859-1938) had in his quest 
for the purity of phenomenological cognition analysed how consciousness is always 
consciousness of something and argued that the conservation of an unadulterated consciousness 
of experience is a philosophic imperative of “scientific” significance (Husserl, 1913/1982, pp. 
24-50). Sartre’s foray was therefore an extension of these Heidegerrian and Husserlian 
achievements with a systematic disquisition on the integrity or ideal quality of self-
consciousness as the constitution of being-in-the-world.   
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In his maiden treatise, a critique of Husserl, The Transcendence of the Ego (1937), 
Sartre developed three critical notions that were later expanded seven years later in Being and 
Nothingness. These were to carve his unique profile as a philosopher. The first he proclaimed 
in the opening paragraph of the former:  
For most philosophers, the Ego is an “inhabitant” of consciousness . . . Others 
– psychologists, for the most part – claim they can discover its material 
presence, as the centre of desires and acts, in every moment of our psychic life. 
I should like to show here that the Ego is neither formally nor materially in 
consciousness: it is outside, in the world; it is being in the world, like the Ego 
of another. (TE, 1) 
 The Ego, the process of our self-awareness, is like anything else our mind contemplates; an 
object of consciousness. “The Ego is not the proprietor of consciousness, it is its object” (TE, 
45).  Secondly, he insisted on the recognition of subjective consciousness as constituted as two 
connected planes: pre-reflective consciousness and reflective consciousness. It was with 
reflective consciousness, the motor that realises self-consciousness as self-reference7, that he 
would primarily be concerned with. It is during reflective consciousness that the Ego, as the 
reflecting “I”, features as an object of the thinking act (as noesis).  His third innovation, which 
is a corollary to the former two, was an insistence that in a judicious application of the 
phenomenological reduction, the “I” that poses as “subject consciousness” whilst it is, in fact, 
a reflective consciousness, should be bracketed off or suspended during the process of self-
reference. The Ego is the as such, a process of the attainment of reflective consciousness and 
not its constitutive, necessary component (TE, 9). Consequently, he insisted that the Ego only 
exists in its transcendence.  The linguistically problematic (see Choifer, 2018)  “I”, Ego, le 
Moi,  Sartre postulated,  is not substantive pole of the structure of consciousness, it merely 
features as a dimension of a process: the noesis (thinking act) of consciousness conscious of 
itself, which in reality becomes the  me.  He would later assert in Being and Nothingness that 
“the Ego does not belong to the domain of the for-itself . . . what confers personal existence on 
a being is not the possession of an Ego – which is only a sign of the personality – but it is the 
fact that the being exists for itself as a presence to itself” (BN, 127). 
For purposes of our developing leitmotif, Cerbone’s explanation of what Sartre meant 
in real terms concerning the existence and role of the ego, as articulated in the following 
quotation, suffices:  
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Sarte certainly does not want to deny that an I or Ego is ever manifest in 
or to consciousness; reflective, or second-degree consciousness is a 
genuine phenomenon, and here an I or ego does make an appearance. 
However, Sartre contends that careful attention to reflective 
consciousness further illustrates the flaws in Husserl’s conception of the 
Ego and its place in phenomenology. Rather than a transcendental, 
structurally essential feature of consciousness, the ego is a transcendent 
object of consciousness, no different in this respect than any worldly 
entity. (Cerborne, 2006, 76)  
At first glance, the foregoing entails significant epistemic marginalisation of the Ego as a 
component of the structure of self-knowledge. The self  (the “I” reflected upon) is relegated to 
an object that is subject to intentional thought. The complications of this disintermediated I for 
conscious experience are variously dealt with among scholars of Sartre (see Priest, 2000; 
Webber, 2020) but its ramifications and genitive connection with Sartre’s radical conclusions 
on identity-formation are not fully explored.  Maiya Jordan (2017), for example, broaches the 
subject by merely observing and enunciating “Sartrean self-consciousness and the principle of 
identity: Sartre’s implicit argument for the non-self-identity of the subject” without drawing 
the ramifications of this superfluous ego on Sarte’s self-identity. As I expound here, we will 
see that this non-self-identity of the subject is not “implicit” in Sartre, it is quite explicit, even 
to the extent of him exhibiting it through his life-acts. 
My view is that the purpose of this emphasis on the ephemeral status of the ego is 
tactically crucial for the structuring of Sartre’s peculiar thought system of existentialism. The 
ego as the collective sum of the intentional process that constitutes the self-knowing self is 
conceived of as being outside, in the world as any other object, so that, like any other object, it 
can be “handled” or noetically manipulated into whatever the manipulator or creator desires 
(eidetic performance). The ego is conceived in terms that allow for its simultaneous nihilation 
through epoché (bracketing) and recovery and re-moulding through intentionality. Any 
contrary conception of the ego, that is as a substantive component of the structure of 
consciousness would, therefore, according to Sartre, be a “hindrance” to this eidetic 
performance (TE, 7). 
In Sartre’s philosophical parlance, the I, as the experiencing Subject, should only be 
conceptualised as in its transcendence (as noesis, i.e., thinking, apprehending what is being 
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experienced), as the transcendent Ego in the process of becoming intentional consciousness 
(noema, the intended thought) (see Moran, 2000, pp.155-156). In this way, in the rubric of his 
developing Existentialism, the I is consciousness objectivised in the real world as the self-
affirming, “self-created” self, the “me”.   
The strategic result of this hypothesis became a schema which,  when superposed over 
lived-life in its objectiveness as accumulated personal history and experiences (facticity), 
renders transcendence as an ontological principle that holds that human existence, as 
conscious-being within facticity, can never be static or determined, it is always directed at 
something other than itself. This line of thought was to be exposited in full in his later works, 
where, inter alia, upon isolating authentically conscious human being as the being-for-itself, 
as opposed to the general world of objects of experience, being-in-itself, he elaborated that “the 
being of man, is becoming”, and this becoming, is a function of an anguish-inducing noetic 
urge to create oneself (BN, pp. 25, 41, 504).  “Man (sic) is not only that which he conceives 
himself to be, but that which he wills himself to be, and since he conceives of himself only 
after he exists, just as he wills himself to be after being thrown into existence, man is nothing 
other than what he makes of himself” (EH, 22).  We first exist, bound by facticity, and are then 
impelled by a transcendence inherent in our being, intentional consciousness, to choose who 
we become. 
Corroborating my foregoing hermeneutic of Sartre’s transcendence, Hazel Barnes, the 
translator of L’être et le néant: Essai d’ontologie  phénomologique (BN) into English explains 
that the use of the word “transcendence” by Sartre, “is sometimes purely substantive, 
sometimes refers to a process”. Notably, she further adds that “transcendence often refers 
simply to the process whereby the for-itself goes beyond the given in a further project of itself. 
Sometimes the for-itself is itself called a transcendence” (in BN, 655).  This explanation 
coheres with my above statement on the essence. It is however more relevant to our later 
observation of how the “I think” of the Cartesian cogito as the noesis of the Husserlian cogito 
simply becomes the me in the Sartrean cogito. 
In The Transcendence of the Ego, as the title implies, Sartre anticipated his much later 
insight on how “transcendence” is conjoined to active-freedom (the necessary freedom to 
choose to act) by the concept or operation of “intentionality”, hence his 1939 journal article 
“Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology” (1939/1970). Through 
intentionality, awareness of self is essentially the Ego in and a transcendence. The ‘I’ posing 
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as a function of pre-reflective consciousness, is the transcendent ego of reflective 
consciousness, and not a substantive constitutive element of the self.  The ‘I’ is thus lost in 
itself during its self-objectivisation.  Consciousness (as reflective consciousness) is the ego 
conscious of itself in its self-transcendence; it is intentional, it is being-for-itself-in-action. 
Consciousness is consciousness of something, “through intentionality [consciousness] 
transcends itself, it unifies itself by going outside itself” (TE, 6). This is how the me is self-
formed. 
 
3. The Self and the Struggle with Facticity 
The interrelated maxims of transcendence, choice, and freedom had to be articulated in relation 
to facticity, that stubborn silence of the situation the human Being finds itself thrown into. ‘De-
philosophising’ Heidegger’s involved postulations on facticity, Steven Crowell’s explanation 
of facticity is instrumental: 
Facticity includes all those properties that third-person investigation can 
establish about me: natural properties such as weight, height, and skin colour; 
social facts such as race, class, and nationality; psychological properties such as 
my web of belief, desires, and character traits; historical facts such as my past 
actions, my family background, and my broader historical milieu; and so on. 
(Crowell, 2003, 101).   
How does self-consciousness, which is the dynamic mode of being we have observed thus far, 
emerge out of this immanence of facticity, the pre-determined world we are born into? Sartre’s 
answer would be an assertion that human being “is at once a facticity and a transcendence” 
(BN, 79), and to deny this would be to self-deceive, to be in “bad faith” as ‘bad faith is a lie to 
oneself’ (BN, 87). Thereby, the challenge of authenticity or authentic being, as originally 
conceived by Heidegger (Eigentlichkeit = ‘being one’s own’) would be found by Sartre to have 
its “shadow”, its non-being, in “bad faith”. He would logically conclude that as abandoned 
beings trapped within the simultaneous reality of facticity and the quest for transcendence that 
causes the anguish8 instanced by the urge to counter bad faith we are forever directed toward 
the authenticity that we can never really achieve (BN, pp. 59, 68-94). 




To be authentic is to realize fully one’s being-in-situation: whatever this 
situation may happen to be: with a profound awareness that, through the 
authentic realization of the being-in-situation, one brings to plenary existence 
the situation on the one hand and human reality on the other. This presupposes 
a patient study of what the situation requires, and then a way of throwing oneself 
into it and determining oneself to “be-for” this situation. Of course, situations 
are not catalogued once and for all. On the contrary, they are new each time. 
With situations, there is no label and never will be. (Sartre, 1939/1984, p. 53) 
Arising out of this phenomenological paradox (not dialectic) of ‘bad faith’ and authenticity, 
Sartre would in a novel fashion observe in Words that “Man is impossible” (TW,  251).  
Cerbone (2006) aptly interprets this as implying that conscious beings ‘lapse into bad faith 
whenever they are tempted to assert identity claims with any finality (this is who I am or what I 
am all about) or to deny that anything serves to identify them . . . human beings lack fixed 
identities, no identity statement is fully true of them’ (2006: 92, 93). 
 Inexorably, therefore, in our critical analysis of the praxis of Sartre, that is, the 
totalisation of his consciousness in history as a being-with us (Mitsein) (BN, 664), we are 
traversing within a problem which Sartre himself as an existential-phenomenologist seeking a 
coherence of his thought system with Marxian Theory battled to resolve in his later life, 
namely, how the constitutively free self-consciousness, the “being-in-order-not-to-be” (BN, 
69) becomes lived social identity (see Sartre, 1961; Flynn, 1984). In contrast to conclusions 
such as reached by Andrew Dobson (1993), among others, that Sartre failed to fuse the Marxian 
strand of his later thought by merely with his existentialism, in our focus on how these 
seemingly contradictory notions of free-being and determinism (nay, the determinativeness of 
being human) applied to his existentialist commitment, we discover a demonstrable logic. This 
is expressed, for example in these passage from the Critique of Dialectical Reason 
(1960/1985): 
We affirm the specificity of the human act, which cuts across the social milieu 
while still holding on to its determinations, and which transforms the world on 
the basis of given conditions. For us, man is characterised above all by his going 
beyond a situation, and by what he succeeds in making of what he has been 
made – even if he never recognises himself in his objectification. This going 
beyond we find at the very root of the human . . . in relation to a certain object, 
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still to come, which it [human consciousness] is trying to bring into being. This 
is what we call the project (in Priest, 2001, 308). 
This is not a new brand of humanism; it is a formulation of combative selfhood that is at all 
instances mobilised to rupture the ever-present constraints to human self-actualisation, 
wherever these constraints occur, irrespective of the geographic location, nationality, ethnicity 
or gender of the human subjects. At the heart of this is freedom as the ontological imperative 
and energy to test these limitations.  Self-Identity for Sartre is thus constantly crafted within 
and in opposition to facticity.  It is not some abstract rational notion or some quasi-
philosophical mental state. Identity is the sum of one’s intersubjectivity with the life and world 
we are thrown into, coupled with the responsibility to profile or constitute one’s Self for the 
transformation of that facticity at a given point and time.  
Therefore, I maintain that it is valuable to appreciate how this Sartrean schema of the noetic 
tango dance between facticity and transcendence, and the hypostasis of the resultant totalised 
consciousness exhibited itself in the life of Monsiuer Jean-Paul Charles-Ayward Sartre, the 
white, male, middle class European citizen of France, born in Paris in 1905, son of the unknown 
Jean-Batisde Sartre. I contend that he positioned himself as both the human subject and the 
object of his philosophical reflection. In his rejection of the substantiality of the Ego, he 
imposed upon himself an ephemeral identity of an ever self-making human being, directed only 
by the anguish arising from a constitutionary urge of freedom in both its “technical and 
philosophical” meaning as ontological freedom and in its  “empirical-political” sense (BN, 
505).  
 
4. The Sartrean Cogito and the superfluous Ego  
In her commentary in The Transcendence of the Ego, Sylvie Le Bon draws attention to the fact 
that in the subsequent Being and Nothingness, “there is no longer any Ego or even 
transcendental field. Conversely, the transcendence of the Ego remains a fundamental idea” 
(TE, p.56, n16). The Ego is simultaneously disregarded and appreciated only for the systemic 
value of its explication of the realisation of the intended self-conscious human reality/being 
(BN: 41, 103).  Sartre could thus declare that the Ego is “an empty concept” which is de facto 
superfluous to the structure of reflective consciousness (TE, 40). Moreover, as propositioned 
in Husserl, it is for Sarte, also a “hindrance” (TE: 7). As we already noted, the conception of a 
14 
 
substantive I  as necessary pole of  noetic experience is detested because it hinders the free self-
formation, the eidetic intentionality that results in the new self.  
The Ego as the bedrock of primordial theories of self-identity constituted traditionally 
through referrals to universal human nature, the soul created by God, or inviolable cultural self-
ascriptions, is indeed a hindrance to a reflective consciousness in anguish towards its self-
situating self-creation. It suggests and imposes notions of human being fixed and trapped in 
facticity. But when it is conceived of phenomenologically as only a dimension on the occasion 
of reflective action, as posited by Sartre (TE, 16), the I as the transcendent Ego, can freely be 
manipulated/modulated by reflective consciousness into an authentic self. That is what 
intentionality is for: the active freedom to bracket off even one’s pre-reflective mental state, or 
natural state, during the act of self-reflection. I can freely decide (choose) how I want to 
constitute my consciousness of myself, that is, what to be in real life9. As Sartre put it: “To be, 
is to fly out into the world, to spring from the nothingness of the world and of consciousness 
in order suddenly to burst out as consciousness-in-the-world” (Sartre, 1939/1970, 3).  
As indicated before, Sartre is not saying the Ego does not exist, his concern is its place 
in the singular and unitary process of the self-formation of the self.  The Ego is not only 
exteriorised during its self-transcendence; it is rendered reflective consciousness itself, 
consciousness conscious of its self, as a Subject becoming its own Object (it is thus an “empty 
concept”). This is the process whereby the I of pre-reflective consciousness becomes the me of 
human reality/being, that is, consciousness-in-the-world self-cognising against Other selfs 
(BN: 259-261). The ultimate value of the I, therefore, is in its modulation as me, a being with 
a self-identity, and vulnerable to the ascription of identity by others (objectified, in facticity, 
being-for-others, inauthentic). As aptly observed by Béatrice Longuenesse (2008), this point is 
the apogee of the Sartrean cogito as,  “against Descartes, Sartre does not think that the certainty 
of one's own existence as a thinker, even less as a thinking substance or a mind distinct from a 
body, has any priority over the certainty of the existence of the world outside us” (2008, p.2). 
 In virtue of it being an objectivised reflective consciousness in the world which is in 
self-transcendence, this me, can only be a momentary object in what becomes a stream of 
consciousness (TE, p.21). Inherently, this psychical me, which Sartre insists is sufficient to the 
constitution of the structure of consciousness, cannot be static. Through intentionality, choice, 
the me is constantly being remade. I am my choices. Hence the assertion that “Man is nothing 
but that which he makes of himself” (EH, p.28).  
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Furthermore, for Sartre, the intentionality involved, is a life-long self-making process 
(project) that could only be explained as the hypostasis of “Being and Nothingness”, as in its 
self-transcendence the I becomes the me, an object bound to a series of self-consciousnesses 
that have to constantly transcend the Nothingness of the anguish against “bad faith”, which is 
the tendency to pretend that the need for self-creation is not imperative. He thus, as an 
existentialist, viewed himself as a dynamic nondescript self: “If man as the existentialist sees 
himself as not definable, it is because to begin with, he is nothing. He will be anything later, 
and then he will be what he makes of himself” (EH, p.28). 
Stephen Priest instructively summarizes and dramatizes Sartre’s self-conception, as if he was 
saying:  
An essential part of my own inmost ontology is my capacity to choose, no matter 
how unpleasant and constrained the choices available. I am a kind of 
nothingness because there is nothing that I am independent of my self-
constitution through those choices. My consciousness is a kind of interior 
phenomenological space of non-being, surrounded by the plenitude of the 
world.  (2001, p.107) 
 
5. Implications of a superfluous Ego 
Having been written after his reflective construction of existentialist ontology in Being and 
Nothingness, Sartre’s autobiography, Words, written between 1954 and 1963, is rich with 
philosophical anecdotes that artfully apply his philosophy onto his life history. I shall consider 
a few of these here to amplify our discernment of a genitive nexus between his disquisition on 
the ego and his life-profile.   
Sartre explicitly informs that the fact of having been brought up from childhood by a widowed 
young mother who had to bring him up in her parents’ home, and later moved with him into a 
second marriage, had left him with a sense that he never really belonged anywhere or owned 
anything. He sombrely reflects on how his mother would often say to him “Be careful! We’re 
not in our own home” (TW, 87). Revealingly, he philosophised on this situation, linking it to 
the theme of Being and Nothingness thus: 
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We were never in our own home, neither on the Rue le Goff nor later, when my 
mother remarried. This caused me no suffering since everything was loaned to 
me, but I remained abstract. Worldly possessions reflect to their owner what he 
is; they taught me what I was not. I was not substantial or permanent, I was not 
the future continuer of my father’s work . . . In short, I had no soul. (TW, 87)  
 
He was not obsessed with privileges that accrued out his state of existence as he considered 
social ontology as impermanent. In a complicated reflection on “self-love” and his “self-
regard” as the colloquial equivalence of the ego (“being egotistic”), we find him reflecting in 
a statement that has a parallel meaning to his standard mantra of not being while at the same 
time projecting through self-reflexive consciousness to what he could become, that “because I 
did not love myself sufficiently, I fled forward. The result is that I love myself still less; that 
inexorable progression constantly disqualifies me in my own eyes . . .” (TW, 238).  
 
 Most relevant to our theme though, was Sartre’s habit of referring to himself in the third 
person, disintermediating his participation in his own reflective consciousness.  
Emblematically, in the “Sartre at Seventy” interview with Michel Contat (Contat & Sartre, 
1975), he consistently refers to himself as his own alter Ego. Similarly, he writes in Words:  
 I am always ready to criticize myself, provided I am not forced to. In 1936 and 
1945, the individual who bears my name was treated badly: does that concern 
me? I hold him responsible for the insults he swallowed: the fool wasn’t even 
able to command respect. (TW, 238)  
 
“The individual” he is referring to is himself. He appeared to have taken the I so superfluously 
that even as a literary artist and playwright he would play-act extensively, liberally 
fictionalising himself through his characters. He referred to the philosophic import of this 
practice in his autobiography: 
A few years ago, someone pointed out to me that the characters in my plays and 
novels make their decisions abruptly and in a state of crisis, that, for example, 
in The Flies, a moment is enough for Orestes to effect his conversion. Of course! 
Because I create them in my own image; not as I am, no doubt, but as I wanted 
to be. (TW, 237 
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In the year that The Transcendence of the Ego appeared, 1937, Sartre had completed for 
publication a novel, Nausea  La Nausée)  that he would later refer to as “the best thing I have 
ever done” (in Contat & Sartre 1975). Nausea is a deliberately philosophical work in which 
Sartre unravels the implications of contingency as definitive of life as experienced. Thomas 
Flynn introduces it further, that,  
It [Nausea] is a diary that at first blush suggests the product of an Ego, the kind 
of Cartesian relation that “constitutes” what it observes. But as the story unfolds, 
it is the diarist who seems to be “constituted” by the diary, not the reverse. As 
the author of The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre is exhibiting the possibility 
of achieving unity without appeal to a unifying subject. (Flynn 2014, p.145) 
Accordingly, Flynn poignantly concludes that in this novel we observe “non-egological 
consciousness” concretized in the neurotic behaviour of the failing author, its main character, 
an Antoine Roquentin” (ibid).  In Words, twenty-five years later, Sartre revealed: 
At the age of thirty, I executed a masterstroke of writing in Nauseé . . . about 
the bitter unjustified existence of my fellowmen and of exonerating myself.  I 
was Roquentin; I used him to show, without complacency, the texture of my 
life. At the same time, I was I, the elect, the chronicler of hell . . . (TW, 251) 
Nausea is disclosed as a fictionalized epic that dramatizes his lifelong struggle of refusing to 
take his self as historically fixed, and instead, as recreating itself in the ever-contingent 
facticity. Its title “nausea” echoes the anxious experience of the inconsistent paradox of human 
lived-experience, the “impossibility of man” (TW, 252). Flynn’s exhaustive analysis of how 
Nausea was a deliberate template of Sartre’s state of mind, albeit purely narrative (Flynn,  2014, 
pp.137-153), amply supports my discovery of the causal link between the latter’s 
argumentation for an egoless consciousness, personal psychic state, and the conduct of his life. 
It is the philosophical disintermediation of the  I, as elucidated in our foregoing discussion, as 
the foundational structure of his ontological philosophy that had a profound effect on the 
mapping of his self-identity and concomitant life-project. It imposed a psycho-philosophical 
sense of egolessness, a kind of contingent existence which, whilst the result of his philosophical 





6. Concluding Observations 
Based on the foregoing traces of linkages between his intellectual hypotheses and his life, it is 
apparent that in his commitment to remain a conscientious phenomenologist throughout his 
life, Sartre could not conceive of himself, or accord himself, an ossified natural, cultural or 
nationalistic self-identity. He was philosophically committed to bracketing off the natural 
givenness, the facticity of the nationalistically imposed and genetically derived identity of his 
ancestry and nationality. He could not subscribe to the doctrine of historic existence that is 
predetermined by pre-existing circumstances. He seminally relativized “personal identity” 
whilst simultaneously instituting a tradition of a self-affirming social ontology, the intentional 
construction of the For-itself that can even defy social facticity (see Judaken, 2008; More, 
2008; Lamola, 2016). Concurrently he has nurtured a notion of self-identity which in the 
context of contemporary race theories, supports the de-absolutisation of racial and nationalistic 
ascriptions to identity, as Valentin Mudimbe, rightly observed that, “Sartre, in Black Orpheus 
posited philosophically, a relativist perspective for African social studies” (Mudimbe, 1988, 
36). 
I have in this paper  suggested that the essence of the reflective consciousness of Sartre 
the French man who concurred with  Fanon’s anti-colonial rhetoric against  “his people”, is his 
reflective discovery that as a phenomenologist directed towards existentialism, he could not 
conceive of a structurally substantive Ego, himself, as a fixed substance. From that juncture of 
his discernment of an egoless consciousness, his self-identity became not only relativized but 
ephemeral, both philosophically and historically. Faithful to his phenomenology, his self was 
to be contingently created through the intentionality that brackets his ego while affirming the 
being-of-the-other-in-history as part of his Being. This translated into non-self-loving  
solidarity with the unfree all over the world.  
His demand for the epoché of the “I” went beyond its strict Husserlian concept as the 
personal interiorised event of epistemological reflection. It was the “universal epoché” (TE, 
51) that encompasses all subjective experiences, including internalised externally imposed 
ascriptions. This insistence on the bracketing of the Ego eventuated in a psycho-philosophical 
and concomitant political act of self-bracketing of Monsier Sartre’s pre-reflexive natural elf as 
this transmuted into a stream of transcendences (Hazel Barnes in BN, 655). In fact, even  the 
very prefix of self in self-identity does not fit comfortably in Sartre’s philosophy of the 
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infinitely self-objectivising consciousness. An externalised self that manifests itself as being-
with-others dilutes the preoccupation with oneself, as we saw in his comments on self-love. 
Sartre’s life, therefore, became iconic with the Marxian doctrine of life as praxis (see Flynn 
1984). He materialised his philosophical outlook and reflections in his very own life. He was 
like a medical scientist who was rendering himself as an object of experimentation, using his 
own body as a test, and at the same time as proof of the efficacy of a drug he was developing. 
I may even assert that his project of phenomenological analysis in Being and Nothingness can 
even be interpreted as a protracted personal exercise in “existential psychoanalysis” (BN, pp. 
591, 647). In him, theory or rather phenomenological descriptions of the complexities of the 
structure of consciousness, fused with “projected” life practice and resulted in praxis as 
“revolutionary practice” (Marx 1845/196, p.29), an endless mutually-transformative 
contestation with facticity. 
Sartre's reformulation of the Husserlian phenomenological reduction marked a significant 
step in the history of the phenomenology movement. He “materialised” phenomenology (see 
TE, 50-52). This “materialisation” consisted, in part, in his moving of the discourse on 
“consciousness” from the sphere of the subjective individual psychical-self, to the conception 
of the self conceiving itself in relation to its objectification, as an object with others in the world 
(from interiority to exteriority). He could even as early as during his writing of The 
Transcendence of the Ego, prophetically proclaim:  “I transformed a quiet evolutionism into a 
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